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UP IN THE AIR: LAWSON V. FMR 




I.  INTRODUCTION 
The first few years of the twenty-first century saw numerous 
public scandals and the precipitous collapses of major financial 
institutions, the most notable being the fall of Enron Corporation.1 
One troubling aspect of these scandals was that they occurred despite 
oversight from the corporations themselves and from outside advisers 
such as law firms, accounting firms, and other contractors.2 In fact, 
misconduct within these third-party advising firms significantly 
contributed to the downfall of these corporations.3 In response, 
Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX, or the Act),4 
Section 806 of which prohibits public reporting companies from firing 
employees for blowing the whistle on wrongdoings within the 
corporation.5 
The question presented in Lawson v. FMR LLC6 is whether 
Section 806’s whistleblower protection extends to the employees of 
private contractors and subcontractors of these reporting companies.7 
 
 J.D. Candidate, 2015, Duke University School of Law. 
 1.  See Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 2 (2002) (detailing several large corporate 
frauds that occurred during this timeframe). For a more thorough account of the Enron 
collapse, see William W. Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. 
REV. 1275 (2002). 
 2.  Ribstein, supra note 1, at 3. 
 3.  Spinner, 2010-SOX-029, 2012 WL 1999677, at *9 (Dep’t of Labor May 31, 2012). 
 4.  S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 4 (2002). 
 5.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745, 802 (codified at 
18 U.S.C. § 1514A). 
 6.  133 S. Ct. 2387 (2013). 
 7.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1, Lawson v. FMR LLC, No. 12-3 (U.S. June 28, 
2012). 
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It is uncontested that contractors and subcontractors may not 
retaliate against employees of the public company itself; the dispute is 
over whether, under the Act, “an employee,” includes an individual 
employed by the contractor or subcontractor.8 The Court should hold 
that employees of privately held companies, such as employees of 
private contractors that are in turn hired by reporting companies, are 
not covered by Section 806. Although the plain language of Section 
806 would allow for a more expansive reading, there is no indication 
that Congress intended to encompass within this provision employees 
of private companies; in addition, public policy concerns favor a 
narrower interpretation. 
II.  FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. Facts of the Case 
Two plaintiffs, Jackie Lawson and Jonathon Zang, filed separate 
unlawful retaliation suits against their employers.9 Lawson was 
employed by Fidelity Brokerage Services, LLC, which, together with 
its parent, FMR LLC, is known as Fidelity Investments.10 Beginning in 
2005, Lawson raised objections to the manner in which Fidelity 
Investments calculated expenses incurred in serving as investment 
advisor to the Fidelity family of mutual funds; inflated expenses led to 
increased fees for Fidelity Investments, which were ultimately paid by 
shareholders of the funds.11 Lawson explained her concerns to the 
General Counsel of Fidelity Investments and reported these issues to 
the SEC.12 Lawson claimed that her employer retaliated against her 
because of her reporting,13 and as a result Lawson filed complaints 
with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA).14 
In July 2007, a supervisor advised Lawson to take a “sabbatical,” 
because of the distraction of the OSHA claim.15 Later that year, 
Lawson resigned, claiming that her working conditions were 
 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Lawson v. FMR LLC, 724 F. Supp. 2d 141, 143–44 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 10.  Id. at 144. 
 11.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 4. 
 12.  Id. at 5. 
 13.  Id.  
 14.  Lawson, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 146. OSHA has authority to enforce Section 806, and the 
Administrative Review Board (ARB) has adjudicatory authority over Section 806 claims. 
Lawson v. FMR LLC, 670 F.3d 61, 81 n.23 (2012). Both agencies fall under the Department of 
Labor (DOL). 
 15.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 5. 
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intolerable as her supervisor perpetually harassed her and that she 
had been constructively discharged.16 
Plaintiff Jonathon Zang worked for Fidelity Management & 
Research Co.—the registered investment advisor to the Fidelity 
family of mutual funds—also a subsidiary of FMR LLC.17 He raised 
objections to his employers operation of “veiled index funds” and to a 
misleading statement his employer wanted to include in an SEC filing 
regarding manager compensation; in June 2005, Zang was allegedly 
fired because of these objections.18 Like Lawson, Zang filed a 
complaint with OSHA.19 Lawson and Zang filed separate actions in 
federal district court in Massachusetts against their employers, 
Fidelity Brokerage Services and Fidelity Management & Research 
Co. respectively, and against the parent company, FMR LLC. 
Collectively, these defendants will be referred to as Fidelity 
Investments.  
The defendants are private companies that contracted with the 
Fidelity family of mutual funds to provide investment advice.20 The 
funds are reporting companies subject to Section 806 of SOX,21 yet 
the funds are not a party to either suit and are not owned or 
controlled by any of the defendant companies.22 The funds have no 
employees of their own, a trait that is quite common in the mutual 
fund industry.23 The directors of the funds contract with private 
investment advisors, such as Fidelity Investments, who conduct the 
day-to-day activities of the funds.24 The plaintiffs are pursuing claims 




 16.  Lawson v. FMR LLC, 670 F.3d 61, 64 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 17.  Lawson, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 144. 
 18.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 6. A veiled index fund is an 
unmanaged index fund for which an investment advisor nonetheless collects a fee for active 
management. Id. 
 19.  Lawson, 724 F. Supp. 2d at 147. 
 20.  Lawson, 670 F.3d at 61–62. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Id. at 63. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 3–4. 
 25.  Lawson, 670 F.3d at 64. 
MCCARTHY 2.26.2014 (DO NOT DELETE) 2/27/2014  12:02 AM 
2014] THE SCOPE OF SARBANES-OXLEY WHISTLEBLOWER PROTECTION 147 
B. District Court Holding 
Fidelity Investments filed motions to dismiss both complaints on 
the ground that Lawson and Zang, as employees of privately held 
companies, are not protected from retaliation by Section 806.26 Given 
that the two cases raise the same question of law and have a common 
defendant, the district court elected to address both cases in a single 
order.27After finding the language of the statute to be ambiguous and 
lamenting the unhelpfulness of the legislative history,28 the court 
ultimately found that Congress favored a broader interpretation of 
the statute than that being offered by the defendants. The court found 
that Congress intended to protect employees of both public and 
private companies “who attempt to report [fraudulent] activity.”29 To 
avoid an overly broad interpretation, the court limited the protection 
of employees of privately held companies to situations “relat[ing] to 
fraud against the shareholders.”30 Applying this interpretation, the 
court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss and ruled that the 
plaintiffs were protected under Section 806.31 The district court then 
certified for interlocutory appeal the question of whether Section 806 
covers employees of private companies, noting that “the ambiguities 
inherent in this not altogether carefully crafted legislation have led 
others to a different conclusion.”32 
C.  First Circuit Holding 
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit granted the defendants’ 
petition for interlocutory review.33 A divided panel overturned the 
district court and held that employees of private contractors do not 
fall within the scope of Section 806’s employee protection.34 The First 
 
 26.  Lawson v. FMR LLC, 724 F. Supp. 2d 141, 152 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 27.  Id. at 144. 
 28.  Id. at 157 (“[T]he legislative history on this provision of SOX is notably unhelpful in 
answering the particular question before me because the congressional debates do not speak 
directly to whether employees of privately held companies can be covered by the whistleblower 
provision.”). 
 29.  Id. at 159–60 (citing S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 2 (2002)). The court characterized Fidelity 
Investments’ interpretation as an “excessively forced and formalistic reading.” Id. at 160. 
 30.  Id. The court uncovered a limiting principle from the text of § 1514A, which identifies 
certain protected activity, namely, the reporting of an activity that “constitutes a violation 
of [certain sections], any rule or regulation of the [SEC], or any provision of Federal law relating 
to fraud against shareholders.” Id. at 158 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a)(1) (2006)). 
 31.  Id. at 160. 
 32.  Lawson v. FMR LLC, 724 F. Supp. 2d. 167, 169 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 33.  Lawson v. FMR LLC, 670 F.3d 61, 65 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 34.  Id. at 68. 
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Circuit found that the defendants’ interpretation of the statute was 
“the more natural reading,” focusing primarily on the statutory 
framework and the title and caption of the provision, each of which 
expressly identifies only “employees of publicly traded companies.”35 
The court said these factors removed any ambiguity from the statute,36 
but cited legislative history and purpose as further support for its 
decision.37 Specifically, the court looked to the report of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, in which “[o]nly employees of publicly traded 
companies are mentioned; employees of private companies are not.”38 
Finally, the court rebutted the plaintiffs’ argument that deference 
should be given to federal agency interpretations of the statute.39 
OSHA issued regulations that stated that the whistleblower 
protection extends to employees of privately held contractors.40 
However, the court concluded that the agency did not have 
substantive rulemaking authority over SOX such that its regulations 
should be given deference, as OSHA’s regulations are merely 
“procedural in nature and are not intended to provide interpretations 
of the Act.”41 The court further noted, “if there were an on-point 
holding of the [Administrative Review Board], it might be entitled to 
some deference as to any ambiguity in the statute.”42 But, the court 





 35.  Id. at 66. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2006)). 
 36.  Id. at 70. 
 37.  See id. at 73 (“The broader reading of § 1514A(a) offered by plaintiffs would provide 
an impermissible end run around Congress's choice to limit whistleblower protection in that 
subsection.”). 
 38.  Id. at 77. 
 39.  Id. at 81. 
 40.  See 29 C.F.R. § 1980.101 (2014) (defining “employee” as an individual working for a 
“covered person,” which includes contractors and subcontractors). 
 41.  Lawson, 670 F.3d, at 82. (citing Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination 
Complaints Under Section 806 of the Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 
2002, Title VIII of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 69 Fed. Reg. 52104, 52105 (Aug. 24, 2004)). 
 42.  Id. at 82. 
 43.  Id. 
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley, and Whistleblower Protection 
Congress enacted SOX in the wake of the Enron collapse in the 
hopes that such fraudulent activities could be avoided if there were 
greater protection for those who sought to expose unlawful business 
practices.44 For example, Enron was greatly aided in its misconduct by 
its outside accounting firm, Arthur Anderson, which, among other 
things, engaged in a large-scale cover up by destroying records and 
discouraging whistleblowing.45 Under Section 806 of SOX, titled 
“Protection for employees of publicly traded companies who provide 
evidence of fraud,” Congress afforded whistleblowers protection 
against employer retaliation: 
No [reporting] company46 . . . or any officer, employee, contractor, 
subcontractor, or agent of such company, may discharge, demote, 
suspend, threaten, harass, or in any other manner discriminate 
against an employee in the terms and conditions of employment 
because of any lawful act done by the employee— 
(1) to provide information, cause information to be provided, or 
otherwise assist in an investigation regarding any conduct which 
the employee reasonably believes constitutes a violation of 
[certain sections of the U.S.C. relating to fraud, rules promulgated 
by the SEC,] or any provision of Federal law relating to fraud 
against shareholders. . . .47 
Section 806 is codified under 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. 
Under the Act, a whistleblower seeking relief from retaliation 
must file a complaint with the Secretary of Labor.48 If the Secretary 
does not issue “a final decision within 180 days of the filing of the 
complaint and there is no showing that such delay is due to the bad 
 
 44.  See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 4–5 (2002) (discussing efforts made by Enron to dismiss a 
whistleblower). 
 45.  Id. at 3–5. The Committee on the Judiciary lamented: “Instead of acting as gatekeepers 
who detect and deter fraud, it appears that Enron's accountants and lawyers brought all their 
skills and knowledge to bear in assisting the fraud to succeed and then in covering it up.” Id. at 
4–5. 
 46.  A reporting company is a company “with a class of securities registered under section 
12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78l), or that is required to file reports 
under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78o(d)).” Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745, 802 (2002) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 
1514A). 
 47.  Id. 
 48.  18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(b)(1)(A) (West 2013). 
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faith of the claimant,” the whistleblower may file “for de novo review 
in the appropriate district court of the United States.”49 The Secretary 
of Labor has delegated its authority over whistleblower retaliation 
claims to the Administrative Review Board (ARB),50 and its authority 
to enforce Section 806 to OSHA.51 
B. Agency Interpretations of “Employee” 
OSHA has promulgated regulations regarding procedures for 
handling Section 806 retaliation complaints.52 In the context of Section 
806, the regulations define “employee” as “an individual presently or 
formerly working for a covered person, an individual applying to 
work for a covered person, or an individual whose employment could 
be affected by a covered person”; and “covered person” includes 
contractors and subcontractors.53 Yet, Congress only endowed the 
Secretary of Labor with adjudicatory authority over whistleblower 
retaliation claims, and the Secretary explicitly stated that these 
regulations are “not intended to provide statutory interpretations.”54 
Nonetheless, several courts have deferred to the Department of 
Labor’s (DOL) interpretation of Section 80655 under Chevron, U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel.56 
Additionally, a few months after the First Circuit decided Lawson, 
the ARB analyzed Section 806 in Spinner v. David Landau & 
Associates, LLC.57 There, the employee of a private consulting service 
reported internal control and reconciliation problems of a publicly 
traded company with which his employer had contracted, and was 
thereafter fired.58 The ARB found that the employee was protected by 
 
 49.  Id. § 1514A(b)(1)(B). 
 50.  Delegation of Authority and Assignment of Responsibility to the Administrative 
Review Board, 67 Fed. Reg. 64272-01, 64272-01(4)(c)(43) (Oct. 17, 2002). 
       51.    Delegation of Authority and Assignment of Responsibility to the Assistant Secretary 
for Occupational Safety and Health, 67 Fed. Reg. 65008-01, 65008-01(4)(s) (Oct. 22, 2002). 
 52.  29 C.F.R. § 1980.100 (2014). 
 53.  Id. § 1980.101. 
       54.    Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination Complaints Under Section 806 of the 
Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, Title VIII of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, 69 Fed. Reg. 52104-01, 52105, 52112 (Aug. 24, 2004) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 
1980). 
 55.  See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Admin. Review Bd., 717 F.3d 1121, 1131 (10th Cir. 
2013); Wiest v. Lynch, 710 F.3d 121, 131 (3d Cir. 2013); Welch v. Chao, 536 F.3d 269, 276 (4th 
Cir. 2008). 
 56.  467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (discussing the level of deference owed to agency 
interpretations in varying circumstances). 
 57.  Spinner, 2010-SOX-029, 2012 WL 1999677, at *1 (Dep’t of Labor May 31, 2012). 
 58.  Id. at *1. 
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Section 806, explicitly rejecting the First Circuit’s holding in Lawson, 
and claimed that Lawson was not controlling.59 The ARB noted that it 
is “obliged to follow” DOL regulations “implementing Section 806.”60 
Further, the ARB found that the legislative history and statutory 
framework indicated that § 1514A was meant to cover employees of 
private contractors and subcontractors.61  
C. Deference to Agency Interpretation 
Under Chevron, a court performs a two-part test62 to determine 
whether an agency’s interpretation of a statute it is charged with 
administering is entitled to deference, and if so, the level of deference 
that is appropriate. First, the court considers “whether Congress has 
directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”63 An affirmative 
answer results in the court giving effect to Congress’s intent, and a 
negative answer brings the court to its second inquiry: “whether the 
agency’s [interpretation] is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.”64 Once the court reaches the second question, it applies a 
highly deferential standard of review to the agency’s interpretation.65 
The Supreme Court has found Chevron deference appropriate in 
cases involving administrative adjudication66 and several circuit courts 
have extended deference to the ARB’s interpretation of Section 806.67 
One particularly notable case, Day v. Staples, Inc.,68 was decided by the 
same First Circuit that elected not to follow the DOL’s interpretation 
in Lawson.69 In Day, the court had affirmatively stated: “Both the 
 
 59.  See id. at *4, *6. 
       60.    Id. at *3.  
 61.  Id. at *10–11. 
 62.  Some commentators refer to the Chevron test as a three-part inquiry, beginning with 
step zero, which concerns whether Chevron applies at all. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron 
Step Zero 3, 5 (Univ. of Chicago Law Sch. Public Law and Legal Theory, Working Paper No. 91, 
2005) (“A trilogy of cases, unambiguously directed to Step Zero, has suggested that when 
agencies have not exercised delegated power to act with the force of law, Chevron may not 
provide the governing framework.”).  
 63.  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, 476 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
 64.  Id. (noting that if Congress “has not directly addressed the precise question at issue,” 
i.e., if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, then the court 
proceeds to the second inquiry). 
 65.  See id. at 844 (“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded 
to an executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer.”).  
       66.    See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230 & n.12 (2001).   
 67.  See, e.g., Wiest v. Lynch, 710 F.3d 121, 130–31 (3d Cir. 2013) (granting Chevron 
deference to the ARB’s interpretation of Section 806). 
 68.  555 F.3d 42 (2009). 
 69.  Lawson v. FMR LLC, 670 F.3d 61, 91–92 (1st Cir. 2012) (Thompson, J., dissenting). 
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DOL regulations, which are entitled to Chevron deference, and the 
caselaw establish that the term ‘reasonable belief’ has both a 
subjective and objective component. We agree.”70 In Lawson, the First 
Circuit insisted that this language from Day was merely dictum.71 
If a court determines that Chevron deference is not warranted, it 
still may defer to an agency’s interpretation under the doctrine laid 
out in Skidmore v. Swift.72 Under Skidmore, an agency’s interpretation 
is not controlling on the courts, but can provide “guidance.”73 In 
determining how much weight to give an agency’s interpretation, a 
court may consider “the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the 
validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later 
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to 
persuade.”74 
IV.  ARGUMENTS 
A. Arguments for Petitioners, Lawson and Zang 
Petitioners assert that they are “employees” within the meaning of 
Section 806 and are therefore protected from retaliation under that 
statute.75 The statute is without ambiguity in simply providing, as 
Judge Thompson indicated in her dissent, “that ‘no . . . contractor . . . 
may discharge . . . an employee.’”76 Petitioners also assert that this 
interpretation is consistent with the legislative purpose of SOX.77 
Finally, if the statute is ambiguous, they argue that the DOL’s 





 70.  Day, 555 F.3d at 54 (footnotes omitted) (discussing § 1514A(a)(1)). 
       71.    Lawson, 670 F.3d at 81 n.22.  
 72.  323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
 73.  Id. at 140. 
 74.  Id.; see also Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 244 (2006) (noting that a court “is 
‘entitled to respect’ [the agency’s interpretation] only to the extent it has the ‘power to 
persuade’” (quoting Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140)). 
 75.  Brief for Petitioners at 8, Lawson v. FMR LLC, No. 12-3 (U.S. July 31, 2013). 
 76.  Lawson v. FMR LLC, 670 F.3d 61, 84 (2012) (Thompson, J., dissenting) (quoting 18 
U.S.C. § 1514A(a) (2006)). 
 77.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 75, at 61. 
 78.  Id. at 61–62. 
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1. Plain Text 
In arguing that the word “employee” refers to those employed by 
the retaliating party, Petitioners liken the term “employee” to other 
terms used to indicate a relationship.79 A person advised to treat 
neighbors well would understand that this refers to his own neighbors. 
Similarly, a statute addressing “the manner in which a company is to 
treat an ‘employee’ regulate[s] how the firm deals with its own 
employees.”80 This interpretation is further supported by the fact that 
the forms of retaliation forbidden by Section 806 are not ones likely 
to be used by contractors against employees of the company with 
which they have contracted.81 Namely, the statute forbids contractors 
from “discharg[ing], demot[ing], [or] suspend[ing] . . . an employee in 
the terms and conditions of employment because of any lawful act 
done by the employee.”82 A contractor could only take these 
“‘tangible employment actions’” against its own employees, not those 
of some other firm, “unless the contractor were also an agent of that 
firm,” a distinction that would render the word “contractor” 
meaningless.83 
On the other hand, “[b]ecause the contractor itself is dependent 
on the public company’s business, the public company may be able to 
dictate what the contractor will do, or tolerate” with respect to its own 
employees.84 Petitioners claim that if the First Circuit’s interpretation 
is upheld, this type of retaliation will be unchecked and could become 
even more prevalent.85 
In addition, Petitioners note that Congress used the phrase “of 
such company” to describe the specific individuals forbidden from 
retaliating, but no such phrase was used to limit the employees to 
whom protection is extended.86 And when Congress uses certain 
language in one section of a statute and omits it in another, it is 
 
 79.  Id. at 15–16. 
 80.  Id. at 16. 
 81.  Id. at 22. 
 82.  18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A (West 2013). 
 83.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 75, at 24 (quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 
524 U.S. 742, 762 (1998)). Petitioners also note that in the unlikely event a contractor discharged 
an employee of a public company, that contractor would almost certainly lack the authority to 
reinstate said employee with the same seniority status, which is the remedy provided under § 
1514A(c)(2)(A). Id. at 36. 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  Id. 
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presumed that it did so intentionally.87 
Although Respondents claim that the title of Section 806 and the 
heading of § 1514A(a) favor a narrower interpretation because they 
expressly identify “employees of publicly traded companies” as falling 
under their protection, the heading of § 1514A uses the broader 
language “to protect against retaliation in fraud cases.”88 Additionally, 
the headings of Section 806 and subsection (a) do not refer to certain 
employees that both parties agree are covered by the statute, such as 
those who work for companies required to file reports under 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78o(d).89 Because it is uncontested that at least some section 
headings do not detail every type of employee that falls within their 
protection, it does not follow that employees of private contractors 
are necessarily excluded from SOX’s whistleblower protection simply 
because they are not named in the heading title of § 1514A(a).90 
2. Legislative History and Purpose 
Next, Petitioners argue that the framers of SOX must have 
intended for the bill to provide protection to employees of outside 
firms, considering the extent to which independent companies were 
complicit in the Enron scandal.91 If the First Circuit’s interpretation 
were applied to the Enron case, “it would have been lawful for Arthur 
Anderson to fire any employee who answered questions from an SEC 
investigator . . . or who tried to assist that investigation.”92 Given 
Congress’s desire to “prevent recurrences of the Enron debacle and 
similar threats to the nation’s financial markets,”93 Congress did not 
intend to exclude employees of private contractors from 
whistleblower protection.94 
 
 87.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 75, at 8–9. Petitioners also note that “the inclusion and 
exclusion of the phrase ‘of such company’ appear only 22 words apart in the same sentence.” Id. 
at 9. 
 88.  Id. at 42–43 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1514A, 1514A(a) (2006)). Respondents’ argument 
regarding the titles is discussed further infra Part IV.B.1. 
 89.  Id. at 44–45. 
 90.  See id. at 45–46. 
 91.  Id. at 59, 61. 
 92.  Id. at 61. 
 93.  See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 10 (2002) (noting comments from various parties 
supporting the Act). 
 94.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 75, at 38. Judge Thompson agreed, noting that the 
statute “expressly creates a broad right of action for employee-whistleblowers who suffer 
retaliation at their employers’ hands.” See Lawson v. FMR LLC, 670 F.3d 61, 90 (1st Cir. 2012) 
(Thompson, J., dissenting). 
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3. Administrative Position 
Petitioners claim that the ARB’s decision in Spinner provides 
further support for their reading of “employee.”95 There, the ARB 
held that employees of private companies that contracted with 
publicly traded companies “are covered as employees of contractors, 
subcontractors, or agents.”96 Although Congress did not endow the 
DOL with substantive rulemaking authority in this area, Petitioners 
argue that “the ARB’s interpretation of [Section 806] is eminently 
reasonable,” and that it is entitled to Chevron deference.97 
B. Arguments for Respondents, Fidelity Investments 
Respondents support the First Circuit’s conclusion that employees 
of privately held contractors are not covered by Section 806.98 
Congress intentionally limited the provision’s protection to 
employees of public companies and chose to address investment 
advisors, such as Respondents, in other areas of SOX.99 Respondents 
state that a reversal by the Supreme Court would amount to a judicial 
amendment of Section 806, improperly “extend[ing] its coverage from 
the employees of a few thousand public companies to those of the 
millions of private employers that contract with public companies.”100 
1. Plain Text 
Respondents argue that Petitioners overemphasize the definition 
of the word “employee” and lose sight of the bigger picture.101 The 
provision, taken as a whole, clearly limits its protection only to 
employees of public companies.102 The title of Section 806 reads, 
“Protection for employees of publicly traded companies who provide 
evidence of fraud,” and the caption of § 1514A(a) states, 
“Whistleblower protection for employees of publicly traded 
companies.”103 Respondents believe these titles indicate Congress’s 
clear intent to establish the statute’s scope.104 The First Circuit viewed 
 
 95.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 75, at 62. 
 96.  Spinner, 2010-SOX-029, 2012 WL 1999677, at *13 (Dep’t of Labor May 31, 2012).  
 97.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 75, at 62. 
 98.  Brief for Respondents at 10, Lawson v. FMR LLC, No. 12-3 (U.S. Sept. 30, 2013). 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  Id. at 13. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  18 U.S.C.A. § 1514A(a) (West 2013); Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-
204, § 806, 116 Stat. 745, 802 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1514A). 
 104.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 98, at 15. 
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these titles as “statements of congressional intent” that cut against 
Petitioners’ interpretation.105 And the Supreme Court has held that 
the title of a statute may shed light on the meaning of the text or aid 
in construing ambiguities.106 
Concerning the text of § 1514A(a), Respondents view the phrase 
“or any officer, employee, contractor, subcontractor or agent of such 
company,” as a “subordinate clause regarding company 
representatives [that] does not modify the term ‘an employee’ in the 
principal clause.”107 Respondents also counter Petitioners’ example of 
being kind to neighbors, noting that language such as “‘no 
homeowner, or guest or visitor of such homeowner, shall be rude to a 
neighbor’—makes clear that the protected persons remain the 
homeowners’ neighbors, not neighbors of the guests or visitors.”108 
As to circumstances under which a contractor would retaliate 
against a public company’s employee, Respondents raise the example 
of a corporate “ax-wielding specialist,” who contracts with a company 
to aid in downsizing.109 The ax-wielding contractor could be held 
secondarily liable for the unlawful discharge of a corporation 
employee.110 Thus, under Respondents’ reading, Section 806 “prohibits 
the public company employer from retaliating against its own 
employee, either directly or through a representative; and if this 
prohibition is violated, the public company employee may sue both 
the employer (as the primary violator) and the representative (as a 
secondary actor).”111 
 
 105.  Lawson v. FMR LLC, 670 F.3d 61, 68 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 106.  See, e.g., Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Nat’l Ctr. for Immigrants’ Rights, 
Inc., 502 U.S. 183, 190–92 (1991); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 331 U.S. 519, 
529 (1947). 
 107.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 98, at 16. 
 108.  Id. To reinforce this reading, Respondents contend that the word “employee” must be 
construed in the same manner with respect to each of the terms, “officer, employee, contractor, 
subcontractor, or agent.” They note that Petitioners simultaneously express that Section 806 
extends coverage to employees of contractors and subcontractors and that it imposes liability on 
officers or employees for engaging in retaliation on behalf of the public company, which they 
argue is a contradiction, rendering Petitioners’ interpretation unacceptable. Id. at 20–21. 
 109.  Id. at 24–25 (citing Fleszar v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 598 F.3d 912, 915 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(using the example of George Clooney’s character in the 2009 film “Up in the Air”)).  
 110.  Id. at 25. But see Brief for Petitioners, supra note 75, at 26 n.20 (countering that such 
an ax-wielder would be held liable as an agent, and that the word “contractor” in Section 806 
cannot be meaningless). 
 111.  Id. at 25–26. 
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2. Legislative History 
Respondents assert that the legislative history of SOX indicates 
that it was not meant to cover employees of privately held 
companies.112 They highlight a statement made by a co-author of the 
bill, Senator Sarbanes: “[SOX] applies exclusively to public 
companies—that is, to companies registered with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission. It is not applicable to [private] companies, 
who make up the vast majority of companies across the country.”113 If 
Congress had intended to expose millions of private companies to 
civil liability under Section 806, there would have been much more 
deliberation on the subject.114 It would have been far too monumental 
an action for Congress to take without doing so expressly. “Congress 
does not ‘hide elephants in mouseholes.’”115 
Respondents further support their interpretation by highlighting 
the fundamental distinction between public and private companies.116 
“By accepting money from private citizens, these corporations bear a 
special responsibility to their investors and need to be held 
accountable.”117 Because private companies do not issue securities to 
the public at large, they are relieved of many of these stringent 
internal reporting requirements.118 
3. Legislative Purpose 
Respondents also contend that their interpretation of Section 806 
falls squarely within the stated purpose of the Act.119 SOX states that 
it is “[a]n Act [t]o protect investors by improving the accuracy and 
reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities 
laws.”120 Because “[p]rivate companies are not required to make such 
disclosures,” Petitioners’ interpretation does not truly promote the 
 
 112.  Id. at 30. 
 113.  148 CONG. REC. S7350-04 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of Sen. Sarbanes). 
Fidelity believes Senator Sarbanes’s comments are particularly notable because of the 
“deafening silence of the legislative record on this question.” Brief for Respondents, supra note 
98, at 32. 
 114.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 98, at 32. 
 115.  Id. (quoting Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001)). 
 116.  Id. at 12, 31. 
 117.  Id. at 32 (quoting 148 CONG. REC. H5462-02 (daily ed. July 25, 2002) (statement of 
Rep. Etheridge)). 
 118.  See id.  
 119.  See id. at 37 (arguing that the basic principle that “private companies are not required 
to make such disclosures” destroys Petitioners’ argument of furthering SOX’s purpose). 
 120.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745. 
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purpose of SOX.121 Noting the exceedingly large proportion of 
privately held companies, Respondents insist that Congress intended 
to limit SOX to public companies that have subjected themselves to 
these reporting requirements.122 
Further, Respondents deny that the First Circuit’s interpretation 
would not have provided protection to those involved in the Enron 
scandal.123 They note that other provisions of SOX regulate the 
behavior of lawyers and accountants, the two outside parties about 
whom Congress expressed the most concern.124 Sections 105 and 307 
of SOX increase penalties for auditors and lawyers, respectively, for 
failing to report suspected fraud.125 These heightened penalties include 
a permanent ban from practicing before the SEC.126 Respondents 
argue that such strict regulations essentially make lawyers and 
accountants “whistleblower[s] by statute.”127  Therefore, these sections 
of SOX already perform the function that Petitioners argue Section 
806 must perform.128 
4. No Deference to Administrative Agencies 
Finally, Respondents deny that OSHA’s regulations and the ARB 
decision in Spinner are entitled to Chevron deference.129 Respondents 
contend that Congress’s intent was clear as to the scope of the 
protection and that the interpretation of the term “employee” does 
not require any special administrative expertise.130 They argue that 
Congress’s decision not to provide the DOL with any rulemaking 
authority indicates that the DOL should not receive deference even if 
the Court were to find some ambiguity in the statute.131 They note that 
the Court has previously held that “agency adjudication is a 
permissible mode of policymaking only where the agency also has 
 
 121.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 98, at 37. 
 122.  Id. at 38. 
 123.  Id. at 33, 42.  
 124.  Id. at 40–41. 
 125.  Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 105, 307 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 7215(c)(4), 7245). 
 126.  15 U.S.C.A. § 78d-3(a) (West 2013). 
     127.    Brief for Respondents, supra note 98, at 41 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 128.  Id. 
 129.  Id. at 46. 
 130.  Id. at 48. 
 131.  Id. at 46, 48–49. This argument was strongly supported by the First Circuit, which 
stated, “[b]ecause the term ‘employee’ in § 1514A(a) is not ambiguous, we would not defer to 
an administrative agency’s contrary determination, even had Congress delegated authority to 
the agency.” Lawson v. FMR LLC, 670 F.3d 61, 81 (1st Cir. 2012). 
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been delegated ‘the power to make law or policy by other means.’”132 
V.  ANALYSIS & LIKELY DISPOSITION 
Both parties have significant support behind their interpretation 
of Section 806, including a decision by a court below. But on its face, 
the text of the provision is ambiguous.133 As the district court stated, 
“the challenged draftsmanship of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has 
provided substantial ground within which to stake out different 
opinions regarding statutory intent.”134  
The Supreme Court should hold that Section 806 does not apply 
to employees of privately held companies. Although the legislative 
history is inconclusive, the absence of any evidence indicating such a 
broad extent of protection favors Respondents’ interpretation. 
Additionally, the purpose for which SOX was enacted can still be 
achieved with the more limited reading advocated by Respondents. 
Finally, the interpretations of the DOL should not be extended 
deference. 
A. Legislative History Weighs in Favor of Respondents 
Though both parties claim that legislative history supports their 
respective interpretations of “employee,” in the congressional debates 
Congress did not examine the specific question of whether employees 
of private contractors were covered under Section 806.135 This lack of 
clarity, like that of the text itself, is likely a result of the haste with 
which SOX was passed.136 None of the statements cited by the parties 
is determinative.137 The most compelling argument with respect to the 
 
 132.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 98, at 46 (quoting Martin v. Occupational Safety and 
Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 154 (1991)). 
 133.  “Ambiguity exists when a statute is capable of being understood by reasonably well-
informed persons in two or more different senses.” Norman J. Singer & J.D. Shambie Singer, 
2A STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45:2 n.4 (7th ed. 2007) (citing Lawson 
specifically as an example of this definition). 
 134.  Lawson v. FMR LLC, 724 F. Supp. 2d 167, 169 (D. Mass. 2010). 
 135.  Id. at 157. 
 136.  See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1549, 1552 (2005) (describing the narrow timeframe of the 
debates and diagramming the number of speakers addressing various issues with the bill, none 
of which are related to the scope of individuals to whom it extends protection). 
 137.  Respondents cite multiple occasions on which members of Congress differentiated 
between public and private companies. See Brief for Respondents, supra note 98, at 31 (noting 
statements made by Senator Sarbanes and Representative Etheridge). But see Lawson, 670 F.3d 
at 87 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (noting that “none of the legislative history . . . actually 
evidences any congressional intent to limit the scope of § 806’s whistleblower protection”). 
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legislative history of SOX is Respondents’ contention that “[i]t is 
unfathomable that Congress meant to authorize civil lawsuits by 
employees of millions of private employers with nary a word to that 
effect.”138 
Admittedly, Petitioners’ argument that the protection of 
employees of private companies is essential to the overall purpose of 
SOX is cogent, given the Act’s genesis in the wake of the Enron 
scandal.139 However, as Respondents note, the misconduct of lawyers 
and accountants about which Congress expressed concern is covered 
by other sections of SOX.140 Petitioners’ understanding of the 
legislative purpose is flawed because Congress made no indication 
that it intended to protect all whistleblowers, and in fact included 
language in Section 806 that seems to cabin whistleblower protection. 
B. No Deference to the DOL 
Because of the uncertainty with respect to the other factors, the 
Supreme Court’s decision could feasibly come down to the amount of 
weight it is willing to afford the DOL’s interpretations. The 
regulations promulgated by OSHA identify an employee as “an 
individual presently or formerly working for a covered person.”141 The 
phrase “covered person” includes contractors and subcontractors of 
the public companies identified in Section 806.142 However, the 
Secretary conceded that these regulations are “not intended to 
provide statutory interpretations,” and that “the statute [does not] 
delegate authority to the Secretary to regulate litigation in the 
Federal district courts.”143 This admission by the head of the agency 
should be enough to demonstrate that the Supreme Court need not 




 138.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 98, at 7. 
 139.  See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 75, at 59–60. It is clear from the congressional 
record that SOX was meant to combat the “corporate code of silence,” which includes 
employees employed by both the public company itself and those companies with which it does 
business. See S. REP. NO. 107-146, at 5 (2002). 
 140.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 98, at 41. 
 141.  29 C.F.R. § 1980.101(g) (2014). 
 142.  Id. § 1980.101(f). 
 143.  Procedures for the Handling of Discrimination Complaints Under Section 806 of the 
Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 2002, Title VIII of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002, 69 Fed. Reg. 52104-01, 52105, 52112 (Aug. 24, 2004) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 
1980). 
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Similarly, the ARB’s decision in Spinner need not be given 
deference, as the question of how to define “employee” is a purely 
legal one.144 The ARB has only been given adjudicatory authority with 
respect to SOX, and it has not determined that Petitioners are 
covered by the Act, as none of the parties in the present case were 
parties to the decision in Spinner.145 Given that the ARB, like OSHA, 
lacks policymaking authority, its interpretation of Section 806 in 
Spinner should not be given deference. 
C. Public Policy Considerations 
In trying to uphold the purpose envisioned by Congress, the Court 
will have to consider the possible consequences of its decision: 
increased liability for many large private organizations or a lack of 
protection for the employees of these organizations. Admittedly, the 
demographics of the financial industry support Petitioners’ 
interpretation. The SEC has noted that mutual funds employ nearly 
157,000 investment advisors and manage over $12 trillion on behalf of 
investors.146 Moreover, mutual funds often have no employees of their 
own.147 Under Respondents’ definition of “employee,” neither the 
investment advisors nor the funds would be subject to Section 806 
liability.148  
Yet these policy concerns are outweighed in light of the likely 
consequences of such a broad reading of “employee.” As 
Respondents note, only 4584 of the more than six million employer 
firms in the United States in 2007 were listed on a United States stock 
exchange as publicly traded companies; the vast majority of firms are 
privately held.149 Because so many private employers contract with 
public companies, extending Section 806 liability to private employers 
would have severe implications. In light of this, the Court should not 
hold that private companies are also subject to this liability without 
express direction from Congress. 
 
 144.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 98, at 46. 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Plaintiff-Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 20–21,  Lawson v. FMR LLC, 670 F.3d 61 (2012) (No. 
10-2240) (citation omitted). 
 147.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 75, at 2. 
 148.  Id. at 18. 
 149. Brief for Respondents, supra note 98, at 37 (citing Mary Ellen Biery, Public Companies 
Out-Invested by Private Firms, FORBES (Sept. 21, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/sageworks/ 
2012/09/21/private-companies-invest-more-than-publicly-traded-firms/).  
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D. Likely Disposition 
The Court should not extend deference to DOL interpretations of 
SOX, as Congress did not provide the agency with any policymaking 
authority and the Secretary of Labor conceded that in promulgating 
regulations under Section 806, OSHA was not engaging in statutory 
interpretation. Still, given the haziness of both the text of Section 806 
and the legislative history, there is “substantial ground within which to 
stake out different opinions regarding statutory intent.”150 It is 
therefore difficult to forecast which interpretation the Court will find 
more compelling. However, because the legislative record gives no 
express indication that Congress intended to protect employees of 
private companies, and because public policy favors a narrower 
interpretation, the Court should adopt a reading of Section 806 that 
limits whistleblower protection to employees of public companies. 
 
 
 150.  Lawson v. FMR LLC, 724 F. Supp. 2d 167, 169 (D. Mass. 2010) 
